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COMMENTS
Dying Declarations in Louisiana Law
Generally, out-of-court statements offered as proof of their
substantive content are inadmissible because of the hearsay
rule.1 A well-recognized exception to the hearsay rule allows
dying declarations to be admissible as evidence under specified
conditions. The purpose of this Comment is to examine the Lou-
isiana jurisprudence concerning dying declarations and to com-
pare it with that of other American jurisdictions. It is hoped
that this study will be helpful in drafting a Code of Evidence for
Louisiana.2 Dying declarations will be discussed from three
aspects: (1) dying declarations as an exception to the hearsay
rule, (2) general rules of evidence as applied to dying declara-
tions, and (3) procedural aspects involving the use of dying dec-
larations.
Louisiana has no statutory definition of the "dying declara-
tion" exception. However, from an analysis of the Louisiana
jurisprudence a definition similar to that of other American
jurisdictions can be constructed. 8 A dying declaration is a state-
ment of material facts concerning the cause and circumstances
of the declarant's death made while the declarant is in extremie,
having abandoned all hope of recovery, and fully conscious of
his swift and impending doom.
Dying Declaration as an Exception to the Hearsay Rule
The two requisites for the creation of an exception to the
hearsay rule are necessity and circumstantial probability of
trustworthiness. 4 Discussion of the jurisprudence will be focused
around these two elements.
Necessity. A general requirement for most exceptions to the
hearsay rule is that the declarant be unavailable for testimony
at the trial.5 For obvious reasons, this requirement is normally
easily satisfied with respect to dying declarations.6
1. For a thorough analysis of the hearsay rule in Louisiana, see Comment, 14
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEw 611 (1954).
2. La. Acts 1956, No. 87, § 2: "The Louisiana State Law Institute is in-
structed to prepare a comprehensive projet for a Louisiana Code of Evidence,
covering the rules of evidence for both criminal and civil cases."
3. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 555, § 258 (1954): 5 WIMORE, EVIDENCE 218,
§ 1430 et seq. (3d ed. 1940).
.4. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1421-22, 1431, 1438 (3d ed. 1940).
5. Id. § 1421.
6. McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE 556 (1954).
19621
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Another reason given for admitting dying declarations has
been described as the "public necessity of preserving the lives
of the community, by bringing Manslayers to justice."7 The
ordinarily secretive nature of the crime of homicide argues for
the necessity of admitting dying declarations since the victim is
often the sole witness against his slayer. Although this rationale
of the necessity requirement has been severely criticized by text
writers s it is adhered to generally in Louisiana9 as well as in
other American jurisdictions.
As a result, dying declarations are generally inadmissible in
civil suits,10 except possibly in workmen's compensation cases.,'
In absence of statutory modification, their use is further re-
stricted to criminal prosecutions for homicide. 12 An article of
the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure' 8 has slightly modified
this rule by allowing dying declarations to be admitted to prove
charges of procuring or attempting to procure abortions con-
tained in murder or manslaughter indictments.
Another generally recognized restriction limits the admissi-
bility of dying declarations to statements by the victim whose
7. GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE § 156 (1868).
8. McCoaMIcK, EVIDENCE § 260 (1954) ; 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1432 (3d
ed. 1940).
9. Willis v. Kern, 21 La. Ann. 749 (1869); MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 260(1954); 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1431 (3d ed. 1940).
10. Marler v. Texas & Pacific Ry., 52 La. Ann. 727, 27 So. 176 (1900) (the
court showed unusual candor in observing that dying declarations given with a
view toward civil proceedings might be influenced by concern for welfare of the
declarant's family, whereas such a motive would not ordinarily be as influential
in the typical homicide situation) ; Willis v. Kern, 21 La. Ann. 749 (1869). See
MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 260 (1954); 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1432 (3d ed.
1940).
11. LA. R.S. 23:1317 (1950) : "The court shall not be bound by the technical
rules of evidence or procedure other than as herein provided, but all findings
of fact must be based upon competent evidence." See Clifton v. Arnold, 87 So.2d
386 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1956). In addition, even if deceased's out-of-court state-
ment is held to be inadmissible by way of the dying declaration exception to the
hearsay rule, since these are civil cases, it might be admitted by way of the
res gestae exception considering the very liberal rulings of what constitutes
res gestae in a workman's compensation suit. See Temple v. Martin Veneer Co.,
200 So. 676 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1941) ; Butler v. Washington-Youree Hotel Co.,
160 So. 825 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1935) ; Armour Fertilizer Works, 8 La. App. 720
(Orl. Cir. 1928).
12. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 260 (1954) ; 5 WIoMOR, EVIDENCE § 1432 (3d
ed. 1940).
13. LA. R.S. 15:249 (1950): "An indictment for murder or manslaughter
may contain also a count for procuring or attempting to procure an abortion
and the jury may convict of either offense. Dying declarations shall be admissible
in evidence in proof of either count."
A few Anglo-American jurisdictions have similar statutes or have accom-
plished the same result by judicially modifying the majority rule. See Annots.,
91 A.L.R. 560 (1934), 49 A.L.R. 1282 (1927).
(Vol. XXII
COMMENTS
death is the subject of the indictment even where another is
killed in the same affray. 14 This restriction was rejected in the
first Louisiana case to face the issue, State v. Wilson. 5 In that
case the state sought to convict the defendant of the murder of
one victim by introducing the dying declaration of another killed
in the same affray. The Louisiana Supreme Court squarely held
that the dying declaraton was admissible even though it was not
made by the victim whose death was the subject of the charge.
However, the clear holding in the Wilson decision was not even
mentioned in the subsequent case of State v. Black,'8 where the
court adhered to the common law principle that the death of the
declarant must be the subject of the charge for a dying declara-
tion to be admissible. The Wilson decision would appear to be
further weakened by dicta in State v. Simon.17 However, the
Wilson opinion still seems valid because it apparently was not
called to the court's attention in deciding Black, and the perti-
nent language in the Simon decision was not necessary to the
disposition of the case.
Another limitation restricts the use of dying declarations to
a description of immediate facts and circumstances surrounding
the criminal act.'8 Behind this limitation is the rationale that
it is only with regard to these facts and circumstances that other
witnesses are not ordinarily obtainable. Hence, dying declara-
tions concerning such matters as prior threats on the life of the
decedent by the accused have been held inadmissible.'9 Louisi-
ana has accepted this restriction by limiting the use of dying
declarations "to facts connected with the circumstances which
caused the mortal wound." ° Dying declarations containing other
facts will not necessarily be excluded, 21 but those parts which
14. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1433 (3d ed. 1940).
15. 23 La. Ann. 558 (1870). Contra, Willis v. Kern, 21 La. Ann. 749 (1869)
(dictum).
16. 42 La. Ann. 861, 8 So. 594 (1890).
17. 131 La. 520, 59 So. 975 (1912). The defendant killed his wife and
mother-in-law, but was only indicted for the murder of his wife. The defense
counsel stated in his summation to the jury that the mother-in-law had made a
dying declaration claiming responsibility for having fired the first shots. The
trail court sustained the objection by the prosecution that no dying declaration
had been introduced. In affirming this action the Supreme Court stated that
even if there had been a dying declaration it would have been inadmissible because
not made by the person whose death was the subject of the indictment.
18. 5 WiGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1434 (3d ed. 1940).
19. Jones v. State, 94 Okla. Crim. 359, 236 P.2d 102 (1951).
20. State v. Black, 42 La. Ann. 861, 864, 8 So. 594, 595 (1890). See State
v. Harris, 112 La. 937, 36 So. 810 (1904) ; State v. Wilson, 23 La. Ann. 558
(.1871).
21. State v. Peace, 121 La. 1071, 47 So. 28 (1908) Dellinger v. Elliot Bldg.
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concern facts not connected with the fatal act will be deleted
upon specific objection by the opposing party.22
Several rules relating to dying declarations are not entirely
consistent with the notion that the necessity for the exception is
bringing manslayers to justice. For example, it is uniformly
held that dying declarations are admissible when introduced by
the defendant.28 Similarly, the fact that the killing was not
secret, or that other pertinent and adequate testimony as to the
circumstances surrounding the crime is available, or that the
defendant has admitted killing the deceased will not operate to
bar the admissibility of a dying declaration on the ground of
lack of its necessity. 24
Circumstantial probability of trustworthiness. A necessary
element to the introduction of any out-of-court statement as an
exception to the hearsay rule is that it be made under circum-
stances which indicate that it is particularly reliable or trust-
worthy. In dying declarations this circumstantal probability of
trustworthiness is supposedly furnished by the declarant's con-
sciousness of "swift and impending doom. ' 25 The presumption
is that such knowledge produces in the declarant a state of mind
in which the ordinary motives inspiring falsehood are rendered
inoperative.28 Therefore, the party seeking admission of a dying
declaration must first lay a foundation sufficient to support an
inference that the declarant was conscious, to a certainty, of his
approaching demise. The common law and Louisiana generally
Co., 187 N.C. 845, 123 S.E. 78 (1924) ; Jones v. State, 94 Okla. Crim. 359, 236
P.2d 102 (1951).
22. State v. Crump, 116 La. 978, 41 So. 229 (1906) ; Dellinger v. Elliot Bldg.
Co., 187 N.C. 845, 123 S.E. 78 (1924); Jones v. State, 94 Okla. Crim. 359, 236
P.2d 102 (1951).
23. State v. Ashworth, 50 La. Ann. 94, 23 So. 270 (1898) ; MCCORMICK, EvI-
DENCE § 261 (1954). In the case of State v. Daniels, 115 La. 59, 38 So. 894
(1905) the Supreme Court, in dicta, went so far as to suggest that the Ashworth
case stood for the proposition that the rules of admissibility with reference to
dying declarations should be liberally applied when the declaration sought to be
introduced favors the defendant. The language of the Ashworth case concerns the
issue of whether or not the dying declaration in question would be excluded because
of a strict application of the rule prohibiting opinion testimony. It extends only to
the independent technical rules of evidence such as the opinion rule and not to
the rules peculiar to dying declarations prescribing the proper foundation to be
laid in order for them to be admissible.24. State v. Williamson, 145 La. 9, 81 So. 737 (1919) ; State v. Peace, 121
La. 1071, 47 So. 28 (1908) ; State v. Carter, 107 La. 792, 32 So. 183 (1902). The
above are cases where defendant conceded that he had killed deceased. See also 5
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1435 (3d ed. 1940).
25. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1438 (3d ed. 1940).




agree that in order to establish a foundation for the introduction
of a dying declaration the offering party must prove that the
decedent was in extremis, that he was fully conscious of his con-
dition, and that he made the declaration while under a sense of
impending death, after having abandoned all hope or expecta-
tion of recovery.2 7
The actual physical condition of the declarant at the time the
statement was made is material and relevant insofar as it casts
light on the state of mind of the declarant, but it is not essen-
tial that he be actually at the point of death. 28 The pivotal ques-
tion should be the declarant's belief as to his physical condition,
not what it actually was. Consequently, a subsequent temporary
revival or complete recovery will not of itself bar the admission
of a dying declaration.29 Practically speaking, however, it has
been pointed out that the wider the disparity between the dec-
larant's apparent belief of his approaching doom and his actual
physical condition, the less probable it is that he actually be-
lieved the end was near.30
It is impossible to describe exactly the state of mind which a
declarant must be in before his dying declaration will be clothed
with an aura of circumstantial trustworthiness; but a descrip-
tion of certain qualities intrinsic to that state of mind may be
helpful. The declarant must not merely consider himself in
grave danger, but must have abandoned even the slightest hope
of recovery.3 1 However, the fact that at another time, either
before or after the declaration was made, the declarant had en-
tertained hopes of recovery will not of itself be a sufficient rea-
son to exclude a dying declaration.3 2 Although it has been stated
that the declarant must believe that his death is immediate and
impending,33 one Louisiana court 84 refused to exclude a dying
declaration on the ground that the declarant thought he would
27. State v. Daniels, 115 La. 59, 38 So. 894 (1905) MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE
1259 (1954).
28. State v. Daniels, 115 La. 59, 38 So. 894 (1905) ; State v. Newhouse, 39
La. Ann. 862, 2 So. 799 (1887) ; State v. Keenan, 38 La. Ann. 660 (1886).
29. State v. Newport, 178 La. 459, 151 So. 770 (1933) ; State v. Robertson,
162 La. 641, 110 So. 888 (1926) ; State v. Clark, 142 La. 305, 76 So. 722 (1917) ;
State v. Brown, 111 La. 696, 35 So. 818 (1904). See 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
11441 (3d ed. 1940).
30. State v. Augustus, 129 La. 617, 56 So. 551 (1911).
31. State v. Gianfala, 113 La. 463, 37 So. 30 (1904) ; 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
11440 (3d ed. 1940).
32. State v. Newport, 178 La. 459, 151 So. 770 (1933).
33. State v. Molisse, 36 La. Ann. 920 (1884) ; State v. Judge Spencer, 30
La. Ann. 362 (1878) ; 5 WIOMORE, EVIDENCE § 1441 (3d ed. 1940).
34. State v. Moore, 165 La. 163, 115 So. 445 (1928).
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survive another six or seven hours. The court said that it was
not "necessary to prove expressions implying apprehension of
immediate danger, if it be clear that the party does not expect to
survive the injury."3 5
The best proof that the declarant believed his death to be
both certain and imminent is a direct statement by the declarant
himself to that effect. Such statements may come immediately
before or after the dying declaration itself,3 6 and may even be
separated from the making of the declaration by a short lapse
of time.8 Wherever the declarant's wound is obviously fatal and
the declarant states unequivocally that he believes his death is
both near and certain, contradictory expressions of hope of re-
covery by those attending the declarant,38 including his physi-
cian,8 9 have not operated to exclude the declaration. However,
where the declarant himself makes contradictory statements, one
moment stating that death is upon him and the next expressing
in direct terms the belief that he will recover, his declaration
has been excluded.4o A more difficult problem presents itself
where the declarant states unequivocally that he believes he is
about to die and has no hope of recovery, then makes an appar-
ently inconsistent request such as asking for a doctor or to be
sent to a hospital. On two occasions a Louisiana court has re-
fused to exclude a dying declaration merely because the dec-
larant called for a doctor.4 1 It was reasoned that such a request
was not necessarily indicative of hope of recovery because he
may have been seeking only relief from pain. However, a request
to be taken to a hospital has been held to belie a declarant's
prior statement that he believed death to be near and certain.4 2
This result has not been reached where the declarant did not
know where he was being taken,48 had not consented to be
taken,44 or where the request was for reasons other than for
purposes of treatment towards recovery.4 5
35. Id. at 165, 115 So. at 446.
36. State v. Willis, 181 La. 154, 158 So. 826 (1935).
37. State v. McCollum, 135 La. 432, 65 So. 600 (1914) ; State v. Sadler, 51
La. Ann. 1397, 26 So. 390 (1899).
88. State v. Moore, 165 La. 163, 115 So. 445 (1928).
39. State v. Brady, 124 La. 951, 50 So. 806 (1909).
40. State v. Molisse, 36 La. Ann. 920 (1884).
41. State v. Boyd, 157 La. 854, 103 So. 190 (1925); State v. Bordelon, i13
La. 690, 37 So. 603 (1904).
42. State v. Price, 192 La. 615, 188 So. 718 (1939) ; State v. Gianfala, 118
La. 463, 37 So. 30 (1904).
43. State v. Rosette, .163 La. 481, 112 So. 372 (1927).
44. State v. Brady, 124 La. 951, 50 So. 806 (1909).
45. State v. Newport, 178 La. 459, 151 So. 770 (1933); State v. Howard,
(Vol. : XXHI
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Both Louisiana and other American jurisdictions agree that
express statement by the declarant of his state of mind is not
indispensable and that the necessary state of mind may be in-
ferred from all the circumstances and facts concerning the mak-
ing of a declaration.46 The impact of his physical condition upon
the declarant's mind judged by the nature of the wound itself
and his appearance, 47 statements by the declarant to others,
4 8
and conversations among those within earshot of the declarant 9
are all factors to be considered.
Finally, it remains to determine exactly why courts attribute
trustworthiness to the declarations of a man who thinks his end
is near. Professor Wigmore lists the three explanations most
often advanced by courts:
"(1) The declarant, being at the point of death, 'must
lose the use of all deceit'-in Shakespeare's phrase. There
is no longer any temporal self-serving purpose to be fur-
thered.
"(2) If a belief exists in a punishment soon to be inflict-
ed by a Higher Power upon human ill-doing, the fear of this
punishment will outweigh any possible motive for deception,
and will even counterbalance the inclination to gratify a pos-
sible spirit of revenge.
"(3) Even without such a belief, there is a natural and
instinctive awe at the approach of an unknown future - a
physical revulsion common to all men, irresistible, and inde-
pendent of theological belief."50
Apparent motive of revenge has been held in Louisiana not :to
be a ground for excluding a dying declaration, but only a factor
to be considered by the jury. 1 It is not clear whether lack:of
120 La. 311, 45 So. 260 (1907) (consented to treatment at hospital for the sake
of his wife and children's feelings).
46. State v. Scott, 12 La. Ann. 274 (1857); 5 WIGMORE, EVIENCE § 1442
(3d ed. 1940). .
47. State v. Newport, 178 La. 459, 151 So. 770 (1933) ; State v. Boyd, 157
. La. 854, 103 So. 190 (1925) ; State v. Augustus, 129 La. 617, 56 So. 551 (1911)
State v. Smith, 48 La. Ann. 533, 19 So. 452 (1896).
48. State v. Newhouse, 39 La. Ann. 862, 2 So. 799 (1887) (Roman Catholic
.calling for priest given as example of statements by declarant from which it can
be inferred that he expected to die) ; State v. Spencer, 30 La. Ann. 362 (1878)
:,(told children goodbye and asked his wife to take care of them). See also State
v. Buchanan, 140 La. 420, 73 So. 253 (1916) ; State v. Smith, 48 La. Ann. 533,
.19 So. 452 (1896) ; State v. Somnier, 33 La. Ann. 237 (1881).
... 49;.State v. Boyd, 157 La. 854, 103 So. 190 (1925) (doctor told bystander
-declarant was mortally wounded).
. 50. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1443 (3d ed. 1940).
51. State v. Moore, 165 La. 163, 115 So. 445 (1928).
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belief in divine retribution would be a bar to the admission of a
dying declaration in Louisiana. State v. Black52 listed "a sense
of religious accountability" as a necessary element. However, in
a later case, State v. Blount,53 the court stated in dicta that lack
of a sense of religious accountability would not preclude admis-
sion of a dying declaration, though it'might be used to impeach
the credibility of the decedent. The court reasoned that since a
lack of religious belief does not render a witness incompetent in
Louisiana, a dying declaration should not be excluded on that
ground.54 Further confusion is added to the picture by a Louisi-
ana opinion expressing the view that repeated cursing was no
indication that the declarant was not in the proper frame of
mind, stating that persons addicted to profanity will use it even
on the most solemn occasions.55 Since a substantial number of
jurisdictions where lack of religious belief does not render a wit-
ness incompetent56 are in accord with the rule stated in Blount,
Louisiana probably would not exclude a dying declaration merely
because the declarant lacked a feeling of religious accountability.
General Rules of Evidence as Applied to Dying Declarations
A useful generalization at this point is that once a statement
is found to be admissible as a dying declaration it is treated as
if the declarant himself had given it from the witness stand and,
with a few exceptions which will be noted later, such a declara-
tion is subject to all the rules of evidence applicable to testimony
in court.56 Thus the declarant must have been in all respects a
competent witness :57 infancy,58 insanity,59 or irrationality6 at
the time of declaration will be grounds for exclusion.
Louisiana and other American jurisdictions generally hold
that a dying declaration is open to impeachment by all means
52. 42 La. Ann. 861, 8 So. 594 (1890).
53. 124 La. 202, 50 So. 12 (1909).
54. The opinion referred to State v. Williams, 111 La. 179, 35 So. 505 (1903),
which interpreted Act 29 of 1886.
55. State v. Brady, 124 La. 951, 50 So. 806 (1909).
56. State v. Rankins, 211 La. 791, 30 So.2d 837 (1947). See also 5 WIGMoE,
EVIDENCE §§ 1443-45 (3d ed. 1940).
57. State v. Blount, 124 La. 202, 50 So. 12 (1909).
58. State v. Rankins, 211 La. 791, 30 So.2d 837 (1947) ; State v. Fraaier,
109 La. 458, 33 So. 561 (1903).
59. State v. Rankins, 211 La. 791, 799, 30 So.2d 837, 839 (1947) ("in a
doubtful case, the question of sanity should be left to the jury").
60. In State v. Rankins, 211 La. 791, 30 So.2d 837 (1947), the court quoted
common law texts to the effect that a witness to the sanity, consciousness, or
irrationality of the declarant need not be an expert and that a liberal attitude
should be taken in deciding when a declarant is rational. See also 5 WiGmmoa,
EVIDENCE § 1445(1) (3d ed. 1940).
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which can be utilized to discredit the testimony of living wit-
nesses."' More specifically, evidence of bad reputation for truth
and veracity and prior contradictory statements are admissible
in order to detract from the weight of dying declarations.6 2 Such
impeaching statements need not themselves be dying declara-
tions." Prior consistent statements are admissible in order to
rebut impeaching evidence.6 Other grounds for impeaching dy-
ing declarations, as pointed out earlier, are evidence of a re-
vengeful feeling toward the accused and lack of religious belief. 5
The prohibition against opinion testimony applies to dying
declarations. Therefore, lack of knowledge of facts on the part
of the declarant should serve to exclude a dying declaration just
as it would the testimony of a living witness. 6 Courts state that
dying declarations are subject to the opinion testimony rule,67
but there is a noticeable reluctance to exclude dying declarations
solely on this ground. 8 As a matter of fact, no Louisiana case
has been found excluding a dying declaration on the ground that
it was opinion testimony. This reluctance seems justifiable. To
expect a person who believes himself at the brink of death to
compose his statements in the unfamiliar vernacular of pure fact
is fanciful. Furthermore, if courts are willing to disregard
rights of confrontation of witnesses, oath, and cross-examina-
tion in order to obtain the benefit of a dying declaration, it
would seem unreasonable to exclude it on the basis of a highly
technical rule of evidence which is of much less value in promot-
ing justice.69
61. State v. Charles, 111 La. 933, 36 So. 29 (1904) ; State v. Burt, 41 La.
Ann. 787, 6 So. 631 (1889) ; 5 WIGMouE, EVIDENCE § 1446 (3d ed. 1940).
62. State v. Burt, 41 La. Ann. 787, 6 So. 631 (1889).
63. State v. Charles, 111 La. 933, 36 So. 29 (1904).
64. State v. Burt, 41 La. Ann. 787, 6 So. 631 (1889). See 5 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 1446 (3d ed. 1940).
65. State v. Moore, 165 La. 163, It5 So. 445 (1928) ; State v. Blount, 124
La. 202, 50 So. 12 (1909) ; 5 WIOMORE, EVIDENCE § 1446 (3d ed. 1940).
66. 5 WIGMOBE, EVIDENCE § 1445(2) (3d ed. 1940). Although no Louisiana
case has been found where a proferred dying declaration was excluded solely
because of a lack of knowledge on the declarant's part, in State v. Cutrera, 143
La. 738, 79 So. 322 (1918), the court's exclusion of the declaration seems to be
based, in part, upon considerations of this nature. Where there is room for doubt,
the better view would seem to be to admit the declaration and submit the issue of
sufficiency to the jury. See Bland v. State, 210 Ga. 100, 78 S.E.2d 51 (1953).
67. McCoRMIcK, EVIDENCE § 262 (1954); 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1447 (3d
ed. 1940). See State v. Black, 42 La. Ann. 861, 8 So. 594 (1890).
68. State v. Clifton, 187 La. 62, 174 So. 109 (1937) ; State v. Pierfax, 158
La. 927, 105 So. 16 (1925) ; State v. Peace, 121 La. 1071, 47 So. 28 (1908) ;
State v. Gianfala, 113 La. 463, 37 So. 30 (1904); State v. Ashworth, 50 La.
Ann. 94, 23 So. 270 (1898) ; State v. Trivas, 32 La. Ann. 1086 (1880) ; Haney
v. Commonwealth, 5 Ky. L. Rep. 178 (1883); State v. Saunders, 14 Ore. 300,
12 Pac. 441 (1886).
69. See State v. Carter, 107 La. 792, 32 So. 183 (1902).
1962]
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Generally, the rule which prohibits eliciting testimony by'
means of leading questions has no application to dying declara-
tions.70 Thus a dying declaration may be elicited by leading
questions.71 This departure from the general rule that dying dec-
larations are subject to the same objections as in-court testi-
mony seems justifiable since very often the declarant may be so
close to death that he has but a few words left. Furthermore, a
leading question cannot be rephrased after objection as is pos-
sible when examining a witness in the courtroom. However, the
situation is usually one in which memory may be very easily
supplied rather than stimulated. Hence, courts should be care-
ful that a statement is really that of the declarant and not of his
interrogator.
There is no sacramental requirement of the form in which a
dying declaration may be made either as to words used or means
employed in communicating them.72 Also the thought need not
even be expressed in words. 78
If a dying declaration is in writing, some formality does
creep into the picture by application of the parol evidence rule.74
Where a dying declaration is recorded by a witness, it may be
proved either by the written memorandum or by oral testimony
of one present when the declaration was made.7 5 However,
where the memorandum is signed or otherwise verified by the
declarant, oral testimony contradictory to the signed statement
is inadmissible under the parol evidence rule.7 6 Where two sep-
arate and distinct statements were made at different times -
one orally and one written - it is uniformly held that the writ-
ten declaration does not exclude proof of the one made orally. 77
70. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1445 (3d ed. 1940).
71. State v. Pierfax, 158 La. 927, 105 So. 16 (1925) ; State v. Ashworth,
50 La. Ann. 94, 23 So. 270 (1898) ; State v. Parham, 48 La. Ann. 1309, 20 So.
727 (1896).
,72. 5 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 1445 (3d ed. 1940).
73. State v. Pierfax, 158 La. 927, 105 So. 16 (1925) (no requirement that
it be expressed in particular words) ; State v. Parham, 48 La. Ann. 1309, 20
So. 727 (1896) ; State v. Daniel, 31 La. Ann. 91 (1879) (no need that the
declaration be sworn or in writing) ; 5 WIGMoBE, EVIDENCE § 1445(4) (3d ed.
1940).
74. Professor Wigmore deplores the application of the parol evidence rule to
a signed dying declaration since it is not a contract or other legal act between
two parties. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1450(B) (3d ed. 1940).
75. State v. Gianfala, 113 La. 463, 37 So. 30 (1904) ; 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 1450(A) (3d ed. 1940).
76. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 253 (3d ed. 1940).
77. Id. at 254.
660; [Vol. XXII
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The parol evidence rule does not exclude parol proof of a writ-
ten declaration which has been lost or destroyed.78 It should also
be noted that the parol evidence rule has been held not to exclude
parol proof of the frame of mind of a declarant even though
contradictory to a statement made in an instrument offered as
a written dying declaration. 79 Such proof governs whether or
not an instrument qualifies as a dying declaration and is not
concerned with guilt or innocence of the accused.
Dying declarations must conform to the principle of com-
pleteness before they are admissible.80 Thus, where a statement
is unfinished to such an extent that it appears probable that the
declarant meant to qualify it by some further statement, it is
inadmissible. Similarly, the offering party must tender the
whole of a dying declaration and not just those parts favorable
to his cause. A witness testifying as to the substance of a dying
declaration need not relate all the statements made by the de-
ceased in his presence and the precise language used by the dec-
larant need not be used. It is only necessary that the witness
heard and remembered the substance of all statements addressed
by the declarant to the witness personally or as a member of a
group.8 '
Procedural Aspects in the Use of Dying Declarations
If the prosecution plans to introduce a dying declaration,
the opening statement must mention this and detail facts in-
tended to be established by it.82 Whenever a dying declaration
is tendered, it is the function of the trial judge to pass upon
its admissibility on the basis of the foundation laid by the pro-
ponent of the declaration.88 Once the trial judge has ruled the
declaration admissible, it is the function of the jury to deter-
mine what weight should be attached to the declaration," and
78. State v. Clark, 142 La. 305, 76 So. 722 (1917) ; State v. Rector, 35 La.
Ann. 1098 (1883). For two earlier cases in which the problem. was present but
not raised, see State v. Somnier, 33 La. Ann. 237 (1881) ; State v. Viaux, 8 La.
Ann. 514 (1852).
79. State v. Molisse, 36 La. Ann. 920 (1884).
80. 7 WIOMORE, EVIDENCE 466 (3d ed. 1940).
81. State v. Ashworth, 50 La. Ann. 94, 23 So. 270 (1898) ; State v. Parham,
48 La. Ann. 1309, 20 So. 727 (1896). See 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 251 (3d ed.
1940).
82. State v. Newport, 178 La. 459, 151 So. 770 (1933).
83. State v. Trivas, 32 La. Ann. 1086 (1880). See also State v. Buchanan,
140 La. 420, 73 So. 253 (1916), which held that it was reversible error for thejudge to refuse to hear the evidence offered by the opponent to weaken the founda-
tion laid. See 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 256 (3d ed. 1940).
84. State v. Trivas, 32 La. Ann. 1086 (1880); 5 WIGMoRE EVIDENCE
11451(B) (3d ed. 1940).
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the evidence used as a foundation should be resubmitted in
order to aid the jury.85 The foundation should be laid out of
the presence of the jury.8 Failure to object to admissibility
when a foundation is being laid does not preclude objection
when the statement itself is offered to the jury as a dying
declaration. However, on appeal it does raise the inference that
the trial judge was correct in ruling the declaration admissible.87
It is not error for a witness to state to the jury parts of the
declaration which he failed to mention to the judge when the
foundation was being laid, provided the declaration would have
been nevertheless admissible. 8
Conclusion
The Louisiana Supreme Court has stated emphatically that
a theological belief in a future state of rewards and punishment
is not a prerequisite to the admissibility of a dying declaration.89
Also it has been held that temporal motives such as hatred or
revenge on the part of the declarant will not prevent admission
of a dying declaration.90 Therefore, justification of the admis-
sion of dying declarations in Louisiana today must rest on the
theory that the prospect of death paralyzes the ordinary stimuli
to prevaricate,9 1 much in the same manner that spontaneous
reaction justifies the res gestae exception. Whether or not this
judicial belief is justified is not to be found in law books. The
answer must lie in the fields of psychology and physiology. What
is needed is not legal research, but scientific research.
Withering criticism of the law of dying declarations has
been leveled at the rules which limit their use to criminal prose-
cutions for homicide where the death of the declarant is the
subject of the charge, and limit their contents to circumstances
surrounding the homicide. As pointed out earlier, these rules
developed from the view that the necessity justifying the admis-
sion of dying declarations is the difficulty of otherwise ascer-
taining the truth concerning homicides. However, it seems that
the science of criminology has largely obviated this necessity
by development of new techniques such as fingerprinting, ballis-
85. State v. Bordelon, 113 La. 690, 37 So. 603 (1904).
86. State v. Rankins, 211 La. 791, 30 So.2d 837 (1947) ; State v. Gianfala,
113 La. 463, 37 So. 30 (1904).
87. State v. Bordelon, 113 La. 690, 37 So. 603 (1904).
88. State v. Smothers, 168 La. 1099, 123 So. 781 (1929).
89. State v. Blount, 124 La. 202, 50 So. 12 (1909).
90. State v. Moore, 165 La. 163, 115 So. 445 (1928).
91. See text at note 50 aupra.
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tics and the like. True, evidence by these means is largely
circumstantial, but it cannot be seriously doubted that it is
ordinarily more reliable than statements of a man whose facul-
ties may be greatly impaired by a mortal wound and thoughts
of approaching death.
Several states have, in varying degrees, moved in the direc-
tion of loosening the restrictions on the admissibility of dying
declarations. As early as 1914, Kansas discarded the restriction
limiting the use of dying declarations to criminal proceedings. 92
Arkansas and North Carolina have enacted statutes permitting
the use of dying declarations in civil cases for wrongful death
injuries.9 3 Colorado has gone one step further, statutorily, by
admitting dying declarations "in all civil and criminal trials and
other proceedings."" The furthest departure from the common
law rule has occurred in Massachusetts which permits any state-
ments of a deceased person made under "unsuspicious circum-
stances" to be admitted in civil proceedings, thereby removing
even the need for a foundation to be laid by the offering party. 3
The Uniform Rules make no distinction between civil and crim-
inal cases. They provide for the admission of a "statement by a
person unavailable as a witness because of his death if the judge
finds that it was made voluntarily and in good faith and while
the declarant was conscious of his impending death and believed
that there was no hope of his recovery."'
The experiences of the jurisdictions noted above under their
relatively liberal rules relating to the use of dying declarations
might well be studied by the drafters of Louisiana's proposed
Code of Evidence. Such a study would give some idea of what
impact these various reforms of the law of dying declarations
would have on litigation in this state if adopted.
Timothy J. McNamara*
92. Thurston v. Fritz, 91 Kan. 468, 138 Pac. 625, 50 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1167
(1914).
93. ARK. STAT. § 28-712 (1947); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-173 (1950).
94. COLO. STAT. ANN. ch. 63, § 21 (1935).
95. Mass. Ajnn. Laws ch. 233, § 65 (1956).
96. UNIFORm RuLE Or EVIDENCE 63(5). See also the provisions of Rule
63(4), providing that if a "declarant is unavailable as a witness, a statement
narrating, describing or explaining an event or condition which the judge finds
was made by the declarant at a time when the matter had been recently perceived
by him and while his recollection was clear, and was made in good faith prior
to the commencement of the action," the declaration would not be barred by the
hearsay rule.
*Member, Lake Charles Bar. This Comment was substantially completed while
the author was a student at the LS.U. Law School.
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